This paper addresses inter-agent interactions, an issue that has received little attention in travel behavior research. Drawing upon the economic theory of externalities and the sociological paradigm of social networks, we develop a discrete choice model that incorporates elements of social influence in addition to more conventional factors such as the attributes of alternatives and the characteristics of decision makers. Using simulation, we apply the model to the case of telecommuting -that is, the decision to telecommute or notover two waves. The findings suggest that some marginal adopters of telecommuting are influenced heavily in the second wave by the decisions of others in the first wave. Furthermore, the evidence illustrates the importance of social influence on new adopters of telecommuting in the second wave.
INTRODUCTION
Human beings are social beings. We participate in business meetings. We visit friends and relatives, and sometimes go out with them or meet them in public places. We shop in commercial centers and supermarkets, and dine out on occasion. We exercise in fitness clubs, or jog with our boss and/or our coworkers. In addition, we sometimes attend school, or are present on a regular basis at a workplace where other workers concur, and maybe clients too. These, among many others, are examples of activities routinely carried on by large segments of the public that require, induce, or are facilitated by some measure of social contact and interaction. Gradually, however, steady progress in information and telecommunication technologies has turned arrangements that were strands of imagination just a few years ago, into a reality that is changing the ways in which many types of activities are commonly conducted. The effect of telecommunications on work, commerce, and recreation for example, has contributed to redefine conventionally held notions of social interaction, as the implication of direct, face-to-face contact with other people has eroded under the technological tide (q.v. Wellman, 2001a; 2001b) . Among the alternatives made possible by technological progress, telecommuting, teleshopping, teleconferencing and distance education, have now become realistic options that are within the reach of large segments of the population in many countries. These alternatives, in turn, have aroused substantial and persistent interest in the transportation community, primarily due to their potential impacts on the spatial organization of activities, and the planning implications of trying to cope with evolving travel patterns and their anticipated or presumed effects on residential and other locational decisions (e.g. Helling and Mokhtarian, 2001; Ellen and Hempstead, 2002; Sohn et al, 2002) . Moreover, in addition to the significance that a possible rearrangement of activities in space may have, the possibility of adopting telecommunication-based alternatives is also interesting for what these alternatives can teach us, in a novel way, about aspects of the decision-making process that compared to the classical economic decision-making paradigm, have so far received relatively little attention in the transportation literature, and are consequently less understood. The need for social contact, and the effect of social influence on travel behavior, is one such aspect of decision-making that deserves attention.
Indeed, as telecommunications have started to impact the ways in which many people carry on their business and many daily activities, it is now becoming apparent that the need for social contact should be considered as a factor that shapes travel behavior. In a study that analyzed 1992 Canadian time use data, for example, Harvey and Taylor (2000) found that people who work at home spend significantly less time with others -down to about 17% of wake time, from about 50% for people in a conventional workplace. At the same time, they discovered that people with low social interaction levels tend to travel more, thus suggesting that working at home may not reduce travel for many people, but could only change its purpose (q.v. the modified mobility effect discussed by Salomon, 1985) . Based on these findings, Harvey and Taylor (2000) discuss the necessity of achieving a better understanding of social contact -as the need for social contact, or alternatively the opportunities for a wider variety of contacts afforded by flexible workplace arrangements, could be seen under this light as a relevant factor that affects the travel behavior of telecommuters. In addition to influencing the motivation for traveling (and Salomon, 1985 , lists the need for belongingness as a motivator), it is also reasonable to think that the natural tendency of humans to relate to a group, and to belong as integrated members in the fabric of society, could cause social influence to have a more subtle effect on a number of other travel and locational decisionsin situations as diverse as deciding whether to travel, how to travel, where to go, and where to live and work. Thus, although for the most part still unexplored, the effect of social influence could turn out to be a deeper and significant layer in the study of travel behavior.
It could be argued that to try to fathom the vagaries of human contact could be tantamount to trying to grasp the moon's reflection on the pond. A fascinating aspect of social interaction, however, is that for the most part it does not take place in a haphazard fashion, and is in fact quite structured -as sociologists, for example, have learned from their long standing interest in identifying and analyzing the structures that support social contact, or so-called social networks. Research in the structural analysis tradition of sociology has in fact yielded sophisticated tools to measure the degrees of connectivity, density, centrality, prestige, and other structural aspects of a network (e.g. . In turn, these topological properties of a network are critical in sociology to understand the ways in which social structures may influence behavior. The role of social structures under this view is a factor that could have a significant influence on behavior. It is factor, however, that is usually ignored in some research disciplines, most prominently in traditional economics (Akerlof, 1997) . Interestingly, whilst the focus in sociological research has tended to gravitate towards the study of the formation, evolution, and structural properties of social networks (Wasserman and Galaskiewicz, 1994 ; as shown by a survey of network analysis texts, e.g. Degenne and Forsé, 1999) , there appears to be considerable potential for adopting some of the ideas derived from this body of literature, and adapting them for use within the context of travel behavior analysis. In the specific case of the decision to telecommute, there is indirect evidence that suggests that workers pay attention to decisions made by others -or in other words, that they are influenced by membership in a social network. A Canadian poll, for example, found that 48% of those polled believed that working at home could have a negative effect on professional development if by this arrangement their visibility decreased, while 29% were concerned with the negative impacts of telecommuting on networks and work contacts (EKOS, 1998) . These data suggest that potential adopters may be concerned about the effect of other people's decision on their professional advancement (for example, if others decide to stay in a conventional workplace), on their networking capabilities (if they miss more opportunities to socialize compared to people who do not telecommute), or even, we could venture, on their ability to adopt similar flexible arrangements at some point in time. More concretely, it is possible that acceptance of telecommuting may increase as individuals see more people around them doing it. Conversely, people may be deterred from adopting it if there are too few adopters in their surroundings and/or if adopters report unfavorable outcomes. Social influence could thus be seen, in the spirit of the framework proposed by Mokhtarian and Salomon (1994) , as a social facilitator or a constraint, depending on the direction of the effect on the decision to telecommute.
Empirical corroboration of the social influence hypothesis remains elusive, not the least because data useful to investigate this effect is not routinely collected in transportation studies. In this sense, the work by Harvey and Taylor (2000) is an exceptional case in that it provides circumstantial evidence of the relevance of social contact. However, while said study documents the amounts of time people spend in contact with others in different activity settings, the data are unclear about who those others could be (in fact, identifying the "with whom" of social contact is mentioned as an aspect needing attention in future research). More generally, as noted by Axhausen (2003) , the data required to conduct empirical studies of social networks and travel behavior are not readily available, and thus there is a dearth of empirical studies to fall back on. Future research will need to address the issues of data collection and empirical verification of the hypotheses now being advanced by a number of transportation researchers. In the meantime, however, a number of questions arise that can, and indeed should be addressed to inform future empirical studies. These include: what would be the theoretical underpinnings for modeling social influence on individual decision-making? What would be the characteristics (e.g. econometric) of a model for individual decisionmaking under social influence settings? And at least as importantly, what would be its data requirements? The objective of this paper is to approach these questions, and to investigate, by means of a simulation example, the effect of social influence on travel behavior within the context of the decision to telecommute.
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows. The following sections discuss some aspects of travel behavior analysis vis-à-vis the possible effect of social influence, as well as the theoretical basis for model development, namely the economic theory of externalities and the sociological paradigm of social networks. Next, a dynamic discrete choice model is proposed that incorporates elements of social influence, in addition to more conventional factors such as the attributes of the alternatives and the characteristics of the decision maker. This model is inspired by recent results in the spatial econometrics literature, and in particular by the model proposed by Dubin (1995) to study the adoption of new technologies. This is followed by a simulation example and discussion of the results from the perspective of the range of behaviors that the proposed model is able to reproduce, as well as from the perspective of some of its econometric properties. In the final section, conclusions are drawn and directions for future research are sketched.
THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF TRAVEL BEHAVIOR
Two major branches in the social sciences are concerned with the study of human behaviornamely, the disciplines of economics and sociology. Of these, economics has been particularly critical for travel behavior analysis, as many developments in this field are based on the stream of economics known as consumer theory. According to this theory, a consumer's behavior (basically her consumption decisions) depends on her utility, a concept originally meant to measure a person's overall well-being, but that in modern economics has been reformulated as a way of measuring preferences (Varian, 2003) . Given a range of commodities, and a choice of different levels of consumption (i.e. a consumption bundle), a so-called rational individual n will select the bundle that maximizes her utility U , subject to a budget constraint. In the generic case when the consumption bundle consists of two goods y and z (these could be vectors denoting combinations of goods), the rational consumer solves the following maximization problem in order to determine her most preferred levels of consumption:
. 
In the above, y p and z p are the prices of commodities y and z , and total consumption must be equal to income I . As discussed by Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) , this model becomes the cornerstone of discrete choice theory, and of random utility theory when the analyst's uncertainty is introduced as part of observing the decision-making process. In discrete choice analysis, the ideas from consumer theory are extended to allow a consumption bundle to be defined as the selection of one good/product/service to the exclusion of all other alternatives, with the classical example being mode choice (car vs. bus). Assuming that the choice set facing individual n includes J discrete alternatives, the utility maximization problem in discrete choice theory is given by:
where j U ( 1, , j J = … ) is the utility of alternative j , typically decomposed into its systematic and random parts. The preferred alternative is the alternative that confers the highest utility. The parallels between consumer theory and discrete choice theory are straightforward. Whereas in the classical consumer behavior case the utility is maximized as a function of the quantities consumed, in discrete choice the utility is a function of the characteristics of the alternatives available, which enter the problem as part of vectors n j X . Moreover, whereas the budget constraint defines the characteristics of the decision maker in the classical case, in the discrete choice problem the budget constraint is implicitly introduced as part of forming the choice set, and other characteristics of the decision maker are typically entered as part of vectors n j X .
The formulation in (2) is the workhorse of travel behavior analysis. A trait of discrete choice theory that can be noted, however, is its methodological individualism, a condition directly inherited from classical consumer theory. Examining equations (1) and (2) it is easily seen that behavior in both models paradigmatically depends only on the attributes of the alternatives on one hand, and the individual characteristics of the decision maker on the other. Behavior, under this view, is a result of individual agency alone, with economic actors implicitly seen as atoms that act in a social void, impelled or impeded by nothing beyond their own personal circumstances, and indifferent to any social structures that could otherwise constrain or facilitate their actions. Travel decisions, for example, are made without regard to the actions of other actors, including family members, relatives, friends and coworkers (size of family or other demographic indicators are sometimes entered as variables in the utility functions; when this is done, however, other actors become static objects, part of the social-less environment within which the decision maker moves). The individualistic or undersocialized approach implied by this theory is not exclusive to discrete choice or travel behavior analysis, as it is by far the predominant view in traditional economics. It is a view that now, however, is being brought to task for ignoring the social dimensions of decisionmaking, and thus for failing to account for externalities and information spillovers that appear in a number of important settings when decisions have social consequences (e.g. the demand for education, the practice of discrimination, the decision to marry, etc.; see Akerlof, 1997) . In travel behavior analysis, despite the methodological individualism of the underlying theory, the notion that social contextual factors matter is neither new nor controversial, as the existence of social interactions has been acknowledged in the past. Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) , for example, remark that "[by] considering a group of persons as a single decision maker…it is possible to abstract partially the complex interactions within…a household or firm". Individualism, even taking groups of people as individual decision-making units, can thus be seen as a useful first approximation and a simplification necessary to address already complex problems. More recent research, however, has shown an appetite for tackling some of the additional complexity involved in dealing with these interdependencies, as the small but growing literature on intra-household interactions in decision-making illustrates (e.g. Scott and Kanaroglou, 2002) . On the other hand, besides a limited number of examples in this particular area of research, other aspects of social influence continue to be ignored in the analysis of travel behavior.
Intuitively, it is sensible to expect some decisions to be partly shaped by the interactions between decision makers. In a rapidly shrinking world, even some traditional economic decisions, say consuming gasoline, have a social dimension, as every unit that I consume is one less unit available for everyone else to consume. Individual decisions thus turn out to have social consequences. And while others in my office may not care whether I lunch at Subway or McDonalds, they may not be indifferent to my decision to work at home, or to stay put in a conventional workplace. Interestingly, as noted by Akerlof (1997) , introducing social interactions in economic decision-making results in behavior that more closely resembles the intuitions of sociologists than those of economists. Sociologists, for example, see social interactions as a predominant, even a determinant factor affecting behavior. Some traditions in sociology go as far as to claim that society is everything and all, a view under which a social network becomes an infinitely rigid structure that negates the possibility and indeed the ability of the individual to exercise independent agency. Degenne and Forsé (1999) call this current of thought a form of social determinism, because position within the network is seen as being all-important, and once this position is known, individual behavior can be said to be completely determined -hence resulting in what analytically would be an over-socialized approach. It is possible to envision situations where an over-socialized approach could be appropriate. For example, when individuals face completely new situations or emergency situations where information is not available or is too costly to collect, the behavior of other actors would become a valuable, or perhaps even the only, source of information. Alternatively, actors could have relevant information regarding their options. However, if they faced a situation of extreme peer pressure, their individual capabilities to act on this information could be completely overwhelmed by social influence (e.g. Moscovici, 1985; pp. 348-349) . Beyond some particular cases, however, this over-socialized formulation is not likely to be extremely useful -not in travel behavior analysis, and presumably not even in a number of sociological problems, as there are other traditions in sociology that emphasize the importance of social structure, but that do not deny the role of individual agency.
Of particular interest for the questions set up for this paper are some of the most appealing intuitions of economics and sociology. A synthesis of these intuitions is expected to render possible more accurate representations of behavior, by producing a conceptual framework within which individuals are not isolated atoms that act in a social void, but structural elements of the social network to which they belong. Social structure, on the other hand, would not be infinitely rigid, and the individual agency view of economics would be supported by means of more flexible links that would not deny personal choice but that could impose some measure of restraint. In this way, an approach could be obtained that would not be over-nor under-socialized, but tuned to represent real individual abilities and social constraints. Fortunately for us, the most attractive aspects of both traditions for the case at hand are not mutually incompatible. The link between them is given by the economic theory of externalities (a branch of economics that is based on the premise that interactions between economic actors exist) and the networks analysis tradition of sociology. These two strands of research offer a compelling theoretical basis for studying the effect of social influence on travel-related decision making. The theory of economic externalities, on the one hand, provides the economic mechanism for exploring interactions, in addition to the conventional utility-maximization framework on which most of travel behavior analysis is based. The sociological theory of social networks, on the other hand, offers a substantive basis for considering those interactions, and provides structure to the problem of externalities. These ideas, it will be seen, when made operational, parallel recent developments in the field of spatial econometrics of discrete choice models. This is further discussed next.
ECONOMIC EXTERNALITIES, SOCIAL NETWORKS, AND DISCRETE CHOICES IN SOCIAL SETTINGS Decisions with social consequences
The view, implicit in the theory of consumer behavior, that individuals make decisions unconstrained by social structures pervades much of economic theory. An important exception to, or rather a generalization of, this view, is the work concerned with the theory of externalities, and the related fields of public goods and club goods. This can be appreciated from the definition of economic externalities advanced by Meade (1973) : "An external economy (diseconomy) is an event which confers appreciable benefit (inflicts an appreciable damage) on some person or persons who were not fully consenting parties in reaching the decision or decisions which led directly or indirectly to the event in question." Although exceptionally general, this definition effectively captures some key elements found in other, more specialized characterizations of the problem. Of particular import is the notion that individually made decisions may affect others. A way of formalizing this idea is by stating the following utility maximization problem (Cornes and Sandler, 1996) :
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The above formulation, known as the general externality case, generalizes the classical consumer model by allowing the utility, and therefore the behavior, of individual n to depend, not only on her own level of consumption of the commodities in the bundle (denoted by n y and n z ), but also on the level of consumption of at least one of the commodities (in this case z ) by other agents in the system. Put succinctly, actors care about the behavior of other people.
The general externality is the basis for much of the work done in the analysis of public goods (single goods that result from the combination of individually chosen quantities) and club goods (restricted-access goods available only to accredited members). Specific cases are obtained depending on how the externality is specified (e.g. as an additive form for a standard pure public good, etc.) In its most general form, the model represents what economists call non-meddlesome envy or altruism (despite the fact that an actor cares about others for the selfish reason of increasing her utility!). In other settings, the effect can also be understood as an information spillover. In the case of consumer theory, for example, the level of consumption by other actors may affect how much is left for one's own consumption. Alternatively, consumption by an actor may have additional favorable effects (e.g. if the actor improves the condition of her house) or detrimental effects (e.g. if she neglects maintaining it) that benefit or negatively affect others. In some cases, consumption of a good has an immediate effect on what is produced (e.g. amenities) or left for further consumption (e.g. road space), so that the impact is almost instantaneously felt by all the actors in the system (subject to the geographical or social scale of the effect). However, there are many other situations in travel behavior, including the case of the decision to telecommute, where the alternatives consumed are not tangible, and therefore the key element of the information spillover is not a physical constraint but revealed preference (a "physical" constraint could be relevant if a quota system were in place, for example limiting the number of people that can telecommute in a firm). More generally, revealed preferences correspond to actual observed behavior by other individuals in the system. Therefore, assuming that actual behavior is the source of information (and that actor expectations do not play a role; this could be a topic for further research), it becomes necessary to introduce a time lag in order to reflect the fact that transmission of this additional information, and its ability to influence other decision makers will not be instantaneous.
Bearing this consideration in mind, the utility maximization problem with externalities in (3) can be reformulated for the discrete choice case as follows (assuming a binary decision situation):
Or, rewriting the utility functions, as:
with the budget constraint again implicit in the formation of the choice set (i.e. if one of two alternatives is not available to a decision maker due to supply or budget constraints, there would not be a choice to analyze). 1, 1 n t y − in equation (5) takes the value of 1 if individual n chose alternative 1 in the preceding period (i.e. if she decided to adopt), and the value of 0 otherwise (this variable becomes the reference for the utility function of the other alternative).
1, 1 n t A − and 2, 1 n t A − , on the other hand, are the previous actions of other decision makers (adopters and non-adopters respectively), and θ is a vector of parameters. In this way, the utilities become as much a function of the attributes of the alternatives and those of the individual decision maker, as of how often each alternative was consumed in the past, and maybe also by whom (see below). The general externality formulation then provides the mechanism for studying the interactions between non-independent decision makers. As Cornes and Sandler (1996) remark, however, a greater degree of structure must be imposed on formulation (3) in order to be able to derive analytically tractable results. Likewise, in the case of travel behavior analysis, structure must be given to the problem in (4) before empirically relevant situations can be revealed. This structure is given by the sociological paradigm of social networks.
Specifying the structure of social influence
Social influence in network analysis research is seen as a special instance of causality, when an actor's responses (i.e. attitudes or behavior) are modified by those of other actors. This definition essentially mirrors the one underlying the general externality model, as the utility there, and hence the behavior of an actor, is modified in response to the actions of other people in the system. The close correspondence of definitions across disciplinary lines is suggestive. Moving beyond this intuition, moreover, sociological theory is also characterized by its interest on the substantive bases of social influence, or in other words, the processes that give structure to social influence. Marsden and Friedkin (2004) review a number of substantive processes relevant to the topic of social influence. Social power, for example, may be a conduit for influence when position confers the ability to coerce or reward. In this case, relationships between individuals are those given by a hierarchical structure. Alternatively, power may be a consequence of legitimacy, recognized expertise, charisma or esteem, in which case network connections will be given by kinship, affective, or similar bonds. A second process is competition, particularly in the face of uncertainty, and a distinctive outcome could be to see individuals engaging in role taking, through which they imitate the behavior of their competitors as a way of minimizing risk. Alternatively, actors may try to develop distinctive behaviors as a way of differentiating themselves from their competitors, in which case the effect would run in the opposite direction. The more similar (i.e. equivalent) the position of individuals is, the more likely it is that they will engage in competition. Majority effects, finally, can induce normalization or conformity, when the majority changes the minority, while innovation, on the other hand, is the effect of a minority influencing a majority (Moscovici, 1985) . Leenders (2002) notes that most theories of social influence (which include the processes previously described) can be couched in terms of the concept of social reference. The framework for social reference, in turn, is the result of communication and comparison processes that could take place in combination or in isolation. In the case of communication, structure is a consequence of actors using their significant others (i.e. individuals with whom they have share a link) as their frame of reference. Comparison, on the other hand, embodies structure when individuals use as their frame of reference other actors judged to be similar or in a similar position. It is important to note that the only prerequisite for these processes is that information is available about other people's behavior, even if a conscious effort towards direct communication is not made. A common formulation of social structure is as follows (e.g. Leenders, 2002; Marsden and Friedkin, 2004) :
An important question that arises is how to identify the members of the social reference framework, or in other words, how to define nj w . Festinger (1954) suggested for example that the degree of influence between two actors should decrease as their opinions or behaviors become more dissimilar. This idea is echoed by Akerlof (1997) , who proposed generalizing the distance-decay concept of geography for applications in social space. The strength of a connection in social space would then be a function of the intervening distance between individuals, using a function such as:
where nj d is the distance in social space between individuals, and 1 γ and 2 γ are parameters that control the magnitude of the effect and the rate of decay respectively. Hautsch and Klotz (2003) , in their analysis of innovation decisions by firms, pick up these ideas to develop a method to place individuals in social space (using variables such as age of a firm, location, share of exports in sales, and share of market) and to measure the intervening distance among them and the extent of their social "neighborhood" (using a distance-decay function). Placing individuals in social space is an attractive idea that however poses a problem when a distancedecay function is used to define the intensity of social connections. The problem becomes evident when the density of the sample increases, as in this case each actor in the space of the sample will influence every other, albeit at a rate that decreases with the intervening distance.
The difficulty with such a definition of social structure in a simulation setting (and possibly also in an empirical one) is that, other things being equal (in particular social space), increasing the size of the sample automatically increases the density leading to the undesirable effect that at some point social influence comes to dominate over all other decision-making factors (i.e. cost, time, individual characteristics, etc.) Furthermore, the combination of a measure of distance in social space and distance decay would seem to imply that every new individual entering the system has a direct influence on every other decision maker. That is, if a firm grows in size from 200 to 300, and individuals are located in social space, 100 new individuals will now form part of every personal network. However, while some may know the friend of a friend, hardly will all know the friend of a friend of a friend of a friend. The influence of such a remote individual, if any, would be indirect and channeled through the effect that her actions may have on members of another actor's personal network.
More realistically, an upper bound is likely to exist in terms of the number of significant others regardless of the total number of individuals in the space of the sample. While individuals in a medium-sized organization are likely to have somewhat more social contacts than individuals in a small organization, it is reasonable to think that they will not have many fewer contacts compared to individuals in a very, very large organization. After all, establishing and maintaining contacts consumes limited resources (e.g. time). A matter for further research would then be to investigate the actual number of contacts that typical individuals maintain in the workplace, as well as in other types of social settings relevant for for n j ≠ for n j = transport research (for a discussion of the size of a network in different social settings, see Degenne and Forsé, 1999) . Defining the weights in the following fashion would limit the number of contacts to only those that are directly relevant to the process under analysis:
This can be thought of as a measure of absolute influence. Relative influence, on the other hand, can be derived from (8) 
The latter would imply that overall every decision-maker receives the same amount of influence, although in different proportions from different sources. The different criteria discussed above are not mutually exclusive and could be combined, for example, by adopting an upper bound for the total number of significant contacts, while specifying that influence within the resulting personal network decreases as opinions, behavior, etc. between agents diverge (the reader can refer to Leenders, 2002 for a more extensive discussion of these ideas). All things considered, in the case of the decision to telecommute, it is reasonable to assume that the number of individual contacts will remain within a limited range. Moreover, use of the total level of adoption within the personal network as the structure for social influence would tend to reflect the question: how many people do I know that telecommute in my workplace? As long as telecommuting is seen as an oddity, the likely effect of social influence will be to constrain adoption, by playing into people's concerns about visibility and the effect on opportunities for professional advancement, networking, etc. Conversely, as telecommuting becomes more widely adopted and a social norm, social acceptance could presumably become a facilitator for this type of behavior.
The model
Following a conventional line of reasoning (e.g. Ben-Akiva and Lerman, 1985) , the utility functions in (5) can be used to produce the following statement of the probability of individual n selecting alternative 1:
Assuming the usual linear-in-parameters specification and distribution for the error terms (Extreme Value Type I, scale parameter set to 1), the utility functions can be written as:
to produce the following logit model: 
If individual j is one of n's significant others otherwise It is easy to see that the model in (12) above is a variation of the spatial econometric model proposed by Dubin (1995) for modeling the diffusion of innovation in geographical space. We shall call this model a logit with spatial dependencies (LSpD), and our model a logit with social dependencies (LSoD). There are a few noteworthy differences between these two models. First, LSpD was designed to analyze the adoption of new technologies. An implicit assumption in this type of analysis is that the new technology is an improvement over existing technologies, and that a major factor holding back widespread adoption of the innovation is lack of knowledge or uncertainty on the part of potential adopters. Although spontaneous adoption is possible at any time, as the ranks of previous adopters swell, the effect of their actions on others is to broaden the information field in geographical space in such a way that a larger number of actors become aware of the innovation and more likely to adopt it. At the same time, this effect could be seen as a reduction of the inherent uncertainty surrounding adoption, as the technology is increasingly perceived as "tried and tested". On the other hand, since there is little value in going back to an old technology, once that a given actor has adopted the new technology her personal choice problem vanishes. For this reason, in the LSpD model second (and more generally, later wave) analyses consider only previous nonadopters as the pool of potential decision makers, as those who already adopted do not have the option of turning back. Travel-related decisions, and even locational decisions, in contrast, are seldom this definitive, and some measure of flexibility seems to be called for. Therefore, in the LSoD model we allow non-adopters to select between the alternatives to do nothing (i.e. do not adopt) or to adopt, but in addition, and unlike the LSpD model, previous adopters in our model have the alternative to do nothing (i.e. continue to telecommute) or to revert to the original state (i.e. drop the telecommuting arrangements). A secondary consequence of the way the LSpD model is set-up is that previous adopters enter the analysis only through the influence they exert on non-adopters in a second, third, etc. round of adoption. Since these individuals do no longer have a choice, the effect of inertia for them can be thought of as becoming infinite. The situation is different when decision makers face the possibility of confirming a previous decision or alternatively, of reverting to a previous state. In this case, previous experience becomes relevant and can be associated with the effect of learning, or satisfaction with the decision to change from the status-quo to an alternative state. This is represented in the LSoD model by the term ( )
A second difference concerns the sources of influence. In the LSpD model the influence comes from previous adopters only, and pushes exclusively in one direction (i.e. to adopt). This is a reasonable way of specifying influence within the context of adoption of new technologies, since overall adoption levels will tend to follow the familiar s-curve of innovation diffusion. Given a sufficiently long period of time the market will become saturated, with every individual in the population (or as many as to make no difference) having become an adopter of the new technology. Since 100% telecommuting levels do not seem to be a realistic prospect, in contrast, our model posits two types of influence, namely from previous adopters and previous non-adopters, that result in a push-pull effect that does not necessarily guarantee that full adoption is the inevitable long term outcome of the process. Depending on how the utility functions are written, the effect of previous adopters and nonadopters could be of the same magnitude if "Actions by others" is a generic variable that shares the same parameter across utility functions ( 1 2 δ δ = ) or they could be of different magnitudes if "Actions by others" is an alternative specific variable (i.e. 1 2 δ δ ≠ ). Finally, whereas the LSpD model is derived as a latent variable model, in our case the model is couched within the utility framework more commonly used in travel behavior analysis.
Finally, a word concerning the estimation of the model is in order. Estimation of the parameters hinges on the way the structure of social interaction is specified. When social influence is given by equations (8) or (9) this poses no particular difficulties, since the resulting model yields a standard log-likelihood function and therefore parameters that can be estimated using conventional software. The situation changes, however, when a distance decay-function is used. In more general terms, when the weights ij w are parameterized, the model yields a non-standard log-likelihood function that requires custom-written code for estimation.
A typology of social interactions
It is useful at this point to place our model with social interactions in context. The typology of interactions proposed by Dugundji and Gulyas (2003) offers a valuable reference framework to do this. In their typology, these researchers discuss two important concepts helpful to understand the mechanisms of operation of social influence, namely, the spatial domain of the interactions and their quality.
The first of these concepts considers two spatial domains within which interactions can take place, namely networks in social space and networks in geographical space. The distinction between these two spatial domains helps to give some clarity to what would otherwise be a complex set of interdependencies. It is quite conceivable, for instance, that the extent of a social network will be constrained to a certain degree by the geographical awareness and reach of its individual members, considering that the potential for establishing and maintaining social contacts will almost certainly follow a distance-decay pattern in geographical space (Moore, 1970) . On the other hand, an existing social network, stretched and pinned on geographical space could also expand the geographical awareness and perhaps also the range of its individual constituents. In addition to these two spatial domains, one additional domain can be added that emerges due to the increased use of information and telecommunication technologies, since these technologies provide access to a different type of space (cyberspace) that even now is beginning to interact with the social domain. The interplay between different spatial domains raises interesting questions about the formation, and evolution or stability of the social networks in geographical and cyber-space. The ability to think clearly about the different spatial domains, although useful, does not make the need to deal with the potentially complex ways in which they relate to each other less necessary. This is a factor that should be taken into account when studying social interactions, perhaps by decomposing the relative influence channeled through each spatial domain. Given the complexities involved, an interesting aspect of the decision to telecommute is that (intrahousehold interactions aside) the social and the geographical networks of the actors will probably match exactly -with influence taking place within the limited space of the workplace. This provides a well-defined case that simplifies the overall problem of studying social influence.
The second dimension of the typology concerns the quality of the interactions, with two cases arising, namely, when the vehicle for influence is an aggregate of outcomes due to nonidentifiable (i.e. anonymous) actors in a network, or when influence is more personal and due to identifiable (i.e. named) actors in a network. These two different qualities (i.e. identifiable vs. non-identifiable) are relevant because they reflect different ways in which decisionmaking could be influenced by social structure. Consider, as an example, the self-selectivity issues in residential choices that arise when income, ethnicity or race are factors that influence the decision-making process. In such a situation, a decision maker could possibly be swayed to some extent by the proportion of residents that belong to each of several categories, depending on what characteristics she is looking for. For example, if she is looking for a predominantly white neighborhood, or one matching her own income characteristics, only the aggregate outcome of other people's decisions matters, regardless of whether or not she can "name" (i.e. identify) other actors in the network. Note that in this example interaction takes place primarily in the spatial domain. A similar situation appears for business locational decisions when there are competition or agglomeration effects. In a different setting, the role of social influence on car ownership can be thought of as (at least in some cases) being a result of aggregates of outcomes. In addition to prices and other traditional economic indicators it also seems plausible that some individuals will react when making decisions to what other people are driving. For example, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that individuals tend to feel safer driving a large vehicle (i.e. an SUV) when many others decide to own and drive such large vehicles (this has been dubbed a highway arms race by the media, e.g. Cloud and Bower, 2003) . In this case the influence comes from the perceived proportion of vehicles of different types seen on the roads, and again it is irrelevant whether others drivers are identifiable actors. Note that decision makers will be affected only if they are aware of many SUVs on the roads that they tend to use, and thus the interdependency between geographical space and social influence.
The examples above are cases where non-identifiable actors, or in other words, the collective actions of people in a network, may exert some influence on individual decision makers. In other situations, a more tangible reference framework is required for social influence to take hold, in which case it is important that actors be identifiable. For example, when informal support networks (i.e. networks that provide non-market, essentially priceless services) are relevant, it is not enough to say that some people within the same income level or of the same ethnic extraction live in the neighborhood. Actors must be able to tell family, friends and relatives from other people, since these are the individuals most likely to provide supportand therefore it is their locational decisions what could in any event exert some measure of influence. Car ownership, when status-seeking is a form of behavior, also requires a personal network of identifiable actors to provide a reference framework to support the competition implied, since by definition a status-seeking individual will not be satisfied with owning a very fancy vehicle if it is not the fanciest vehicle in her circle. Alternatively, a certain type of vehicle may come to be a mark of prestige if some, but not all individuals in the network own one, or conversely somewhat lower status may be attached to a vehicle if a majority of people own one like it. In the case of telecommuting, on the other hand, the intellectual knowledge of adoption statistics is unlikely to carry the same weight as the direct experience of observing acquaintances or friends in the workplace adopt telecommuting, of communicating with previous adopters, and of having a concrete reference framework for comparing one's own position. It would matter little if 40% of the employees in a firm telecommute, if an actor knows none of them, and no one in her section telecommutes. The proportions in this case are probably not enough to exert influence.
The preceding discussion does not imply that the existence of one type of effect (in social vs. geographical space or by identifiable vs. non-identifiable actors) excludes the other, as several may well operate simultaneously. The challenge, however, lays in incorporating all these different types of media for interactions in an integrated analytical framework. As usual, the best way to approach this problem is to begin at the beginning, addressing particular cases. The decision to telecommute is a case amenable to this sort of treatment as it deals mainly with only one of such dimensions (identifiable actors) in a geographically constrained social network that makes the distinction between spatial domains less critical.
SIMULATION EXAMPLE: THE CASE OF TELECOMMUTING

Simulation design
A Monte Carlo simulation was designed to test the model proposed in the preceding section. The first step to set up the experiment was to simulate a social network. Based on the idea of social space, a network was produced by simulating the location of a number of individuals in two-dimensional social space, using sample sizes ranging from 100 to 500 in increments of 50. Location in social space was given by two randomly generated orthogonal variables that could represent, for example, values in a scale of attitudes, beliefs, concerns, social values, or some other indicator of personal character or inclination. (If more than two of these variables existed in an empirical situation, multidimensional scaling could be used to reduce them to two dimensions). In the present case, these two variables were designed to be independent from other variables in the simulation, and did not otherwise enter the utility functions of the alternatives. After individuals were placed in social space, a random number of contacts (between 1 and 10) was assigned to each of them (average number of contacts was about 5), with a link between two individuals being more likely when the individuals were close to each other in social space. It is important to note that for comparability purposes only one social network was simulated for each sample size. In other words, we simulated a total of 9 networks, which we then used for a set number of replications as described below. A simulated network can be thought of as placeholders woven in a net that is used to place a different set of randomly generated individuals at each replication. An example of such a network ( 200 n = ) is shown in Figure 1 .
The second step was to generate the random variables for each individual in the sample and each alternative, for 1000 replications. Two alternatives were defined as (T)elecommuting and (C)ommuting to a conventional workplace. For these, three variables were generated to simulate adoption in Wave 1. The first of these was simply a constant specific to the telecommuting alternative. By omission, the relevant constant was set to zero in the other alternative. The second variable was designed to resemble travel time under telecommuting ( n T t ) and conventional commuting ( x ) is a generic variable that could represent some characteristic of the decision maker, or alternatively, some other condition at her workplace. This variable was drawn from a normal distribution. Finally, a set of error terms was simulated for each of the replications, drawing from an Extreme Value Type I distribution, assuming the usual value for the variance. Using these variables, and the true values of the parameters ( 1 2.5
0.5 β = − and 3 1.5 β = ), the utility functions for the case of telecommuting and commuting to a conventional workplace in Wave 1 were computed as:
, 1 2 3 , 1
and used to calculate the probability of adoption. If this probability exceeded 0.5, the corresponding individual was then assumed to become an adopter.
In the third step, the same random variables were used for simulating adoption in Wave 2. In other words, at this stage we assumed that all systematic conditions remained unchanged from Wave 1 to Wave 2, and that the only new factor entering the decision making process of the individual is the effect of learning, from others and from her previous self (note that other variables do not carry a time subscript.) We assumed, however, that although the variables used in Wave 1 did not change, there could have been changes in other unobserved factors.
To reflect the possibility of these changes, a second set of error terms was simulated for use in Wave 2 calculations, drawn as above from an EV distribution. Four different cases were analyzed in Wave 2, namely, a benchmark case assuming no social influence effects (CASE 1), two more cases assuming influence from previous adopters only (CASE 2) and influence from previous non-adopters only (CASE 3), and a final case assuming that the influence of both adopters and non-adopters (net social influence) is relevant to the decision to telecommute (CASE 4). These cases cover all relevant combinations of "positive' and "negative" influence due to social interaction. The utility functions in Wave 2 for CASE 4 (net influence) are as follow:
, 2 3 2 , 1 , (15), is a function that represents the level of satisfaction with telecommuting. This function depends on having adopted telecommuting in Wave 1, i.e., its value is 0 if an individual did not adopt in the previous period (in which case there is no learning effect), while for previous adopters the variable was simulated drawing from a normal distribution with a mean of 0.84162 and a standard deviation of 1. In this way, about 80% of adopters have a (varying) positive level of satisfaction with their telecommuting arrangements, while approximately 20% of adopters have a negative level of satisfaction in each replication. Clearly, a positive level of satisfaction would tend to reinforce the decision to continue telecommuting, while a negative would encourage discontinuing the practice. The learning effect in this simulation is fairly simple, but more sophisticated extensions could be achieved based on the theory of expected utility (e.g. De Palma and Picard, 2004) . The other two terms are social influence effects, or "Actions by others" ( 1, 1 n t A − and 2, 1 n t A − ), when the others are adopters or non-adopters respectively. These terms are defined as in equation (8) above, using an additive function to represent the total level of adoption (or non-adoption) within the awareness range/personal network of each individual actor, and are calculated based on Wave 1 decisions and the configuration of connections in the network. The results of the experiment are discussed next. As an aside, note that the simulations reported in this paper were conducted using the MATLAB computing environment. The code needed to replicate the experiment is available upon request from the first author. Table 1 summarizes the results of the simulation experiment by presenting the mean of 1000 replications for a number of adoption indicators, using a sample size of 500. These results are qualitatively similar across sample sizes. For the selected sample size, there were on average 129 adopters in Wave 1, a sizable number of which discontinued telecommuting in Wave 2. At most, this number accounted for 32% of adopters in the cases of no social influence (CASE 1) and only the influence of previous non-adopters (CASE 3). As expected, when only the influence of previous adopters is considered, the decline in number is least (CASE 2 = 21%). The results are also as expected when the influence of both adopters and non-adopters are considered simultaneously -that is, a decline in number is experienced somewhere between the extreme cases (26%). The reason for the decline in numbers from Wave 1 and Wave 2 is that some adopters in the former wave are marginal adopters. Thus, as conditions change, they drop telecommuting. In general, however, new adopters take their place in Wave 2 so that the overall number of telecommuters for all cases approaches or exceeds the number in Wave 1. Finally, a comparison of the results from CASE 1 to those for the other cases suggests that social influence plays an important role in the decisions of individuals.
Results and discussion
An example of a replication appears in Figures 2 -4 . These figures confirm the ability of the model to reproduce a rich variety of behavioral outcomes, including reversible decisions and other more subtle effects governed in part by the relative location of decision makers with respect to previous adopters and non-adopters. The pattern shown in Figure 1b is for adopters of telecommuting in Wave 1, whereas the patterns shown in Figure 2 are for adopters in Wave 2. As can be seen, the majority of adopters in Wave 1 are present for all cases in Wave 2. These adopters are hardcore telecommuters as compared to those who drop the option in all cases. However, there is a group of marginal adopters in Wave 1 whose decision to telecommute in Wave 2 is largely dependent on the influence of other adopters and nonadopters. These individuals can be identified by comparing those who drop telecommuting in Figure 2a (no social influence) to the outcomes shown in Figures 2b, 2c and 2d . When only the influence of previous adopters is considered in the model, a few of these individuals continue telecommuting. A closer examination of the results shows that the individuals in question are near other adopters, thus indicating the importance of proximity in the decisionmaking process. When only the influence of non-adopters is considered in the model as shown in Figure 2c , the pattern for the original 47 individuals adopting telecommuting in Wave 1 is similar to the pattern shown for them in Figure 3a (no social influence), except that there are less new adopters, in particular in locations were previous adoption is sparse, and a number of Wave 1 adopters that would continue telecommuting under a no social influence setting, discontinue the practice. When both influences are considered simultaneously in the model, some of the individuals maintain telecommuting while others do not. With respect to new adopters, a comparison of Figure 2a to the other figures again illustrates the importance of social influence on decision making. In all cases, when social influence is considered in the model, the number of new adopters and of previous adopters continuing and discontinuing the practice changes as a result of their proximity to other adopters / non-adopters.
The simulation results also provide evidence concerning some of the econometric properties of the model, and hint at the possible characteristics of data needs. We found, for example, that sample sizes smaller than 200 are generally unreliable, and that a sample size of at least 500 could be necessary to achieve desirable properties of the estimators. Although there is no evidence of bias in this case, we found that omitting the social interactions when they existed led to biased estimation. The spread of the estimators of the correctly specified model, on the other hand, appears to stabilize for sample sizes larger than 400. The relevance of this finding is highlighted by the potential costs of collecting social network data, and the underlying tension between economy and reliability of the analysis. An additional finding, as shown in Table 2 , is that for a sample size of 200, a likelihood ratio test (a commonly used statistic for model selection) fails to discriminate between the misspecified (restricted) model and the true (unrestricted) model almost half of the time. This suggests that larger samples might be required in order to realize the advantages of introducing social effects in our model. Again, a sample size of about 500 appears to be adequate, with rejection rates of 90% plus. As for the characteristics of the data, the structure of the model will require historical data, detailing not only who adopted telecommuting but also when. Since the decision to telecommute will with all certainty take place at different points in time for different individuals, establishing the relevant decision-making periods (i.e. who are Wave 1 adopters, and who are Wave 2 adopters?) is something that will require careful consideration. An encouraging aspect of this specific problem is that its self-containment (i.e. limited to interactions in the workplace) makes a variation of the "names generator" technique, whereby individuals are asked to name people with whom they are in contact, a reasonable approach to collecting data on social contacts -without fears that the network will grow unbounded. Comparing the ideas suggested by our simulation experiment to the data requirements outlined by Axhausen (2003) , it appears clear that data collection will have to be purposive and related to the research question under consideration, at least until relevant experience and expertise are developed to guide more comprehensive data collection efforts.
On a final note, it is worth noting that although we report only the results of estimating the full model when it is true, we also explored the over-specified case, i.e., the case when the true model does not include social interaction effects but the estimated model does. The results of this experiment indicate that parameter estimates λ , 1 δ and 2 δ tend towards their true values of zero, even at relatively small sample sizes. Empirically, this situation would suggest the convenience and efficiency of estimating a simpler model that does not include social interaction effects.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The increased use of information and telecommunication technologies is an area of current interest in transportation research (Pisarski, 2003) . A focus of attention has been on the potential implications that these technologies pose for the spatial organization of activities and other related planning issues. In addition, the intrinsic novelty posed by these technologies offers the opportunity to study hitherto little attended aspects of decision-making behavior. Such is the case of the effect of social influence on individual decision-making.
Social influence, and the role of social networks, is an area of research that has just begun to be explored by a relatively small number of transportation scholars (seemingly independently to judge from the timing of their research), who nonetheless have drawn attention to a potentially large number of situations of interest in transportation research that could be fruitfully studied from this perspective. Thus, for example, Dugundji and Gulyas (2003) have discussed the relevance of exploring the implications of interactions in social and geographical space on mode choice decisions, and proposed a model that incorporates the effect of these interactions when individual actors in a network are not identifiable. Axhausen (2003) , on the other hand, is concerned with the increase in leisure travel, and interested in the potential contributions of a social networks approach to explain more diverse travel patterns, as well as in teasing out some important data collection protocols. And Miller (2004) , from a time geography perspective, details the necessary space-time conditions for human interaction in physical (i.e. face-to-face), as well as virtual (i.e. telecommunication-based) spatial settings, and the implications of these conditions for social inclusion and exclusion. Less explicit in focus, but not unrelated research includes Doi's (2004) The difference in focus in the work of each of these researchers highlights the potential for incorporating social influence as an element of transport research in a wide variety of settings. The case of telecommuting is particularly attractive because it offers what could be one of the clearest cases of social influence in transportation-related decision-making, and also provides a problem that is at the same time well-defined (i.e. interactions in the workplace), and selfcontained (i.e. in terms of the potential size of the network to consider). Empirical verification of the hypothesis of social interaction, it must be noted, remains elusive due to the lack of pertinent data. Some questions exist, however, that can be addressed as a way to inform further research. Our objective in this paper, then, has been to attend to some conceptual and methodological issues that emerge when a social dimension is added to the problem of analyzing decision-making processes. Accordingly, we have discussed the conceptual underpinnings needed to derive a discrete choice model with social influence effects. Further, drawing upon the economic theory of externalities, the sociological theory of social networks, and spatial econometrics, we proposed a dynamic discrete choice model with social interaction effects. A simulation experiment confirmed the ability of the model to replicate a rich variety of behavioral outcomes, provided evidence concerning some of the econometric properties of the model, and hinted at the possible characteristics of data needs.
On top of these findings, the present paper also suggests a number of exciting avenues for further research. This research team, in work currently in progress, is conducting longer term simulations (i.e. Waves 1, 2, 3, …) in order to determine, given a reasonable set of parameters and variables, and different intensities of social influence, whether steady states exist in terms of adoption levels. This work parallels to some extent the research done by Dugundji and Gulyas (2003) , who have carried on simulations using their model with anonymous actors. Another intriguing possibility for further research would be to micro-analyze, under different settings, the relative structural influence of individual decision makers by means of measures of centrality and prestige, among other indicators. This will require that we vary the composition of the network (which in our simulations was fixed) to explore the effect on our model of different types of networks, with different density and connectivity levels, etc. In addition, bi-modal networks, that is, networks with two sets of actors or one set of actors and one set of events, could be studied. This would allow the examination, for instance, of power relationships (e.g. within the workplace), self-reinforcing or competing influences in the workplace and the household, or the influence of a given social structure in multiple decisions (i.e. travel and locational decisions). Last but not least, empirical corroboration of the hypothesis of social influence in the decision to telecommute will require a case study and purposive data collection.
Along different lines, an obvious generalization of our work would be to take the current binary formulation of the model into multinomial decision-making grounds. Adopting a mixed logit framework for this generalization would allow us to introduce, in addition to social interactions, cotemporaneous spatial autocorrelation -an effect that, as recent research suggests (e.g Mohammadian and Kanaroglou, 2003; Bhat and Guo, 2004; Miyamoto et al, 2004) , is important in the case of locational decisions. The combination of social influence and spatial autocorrelation is expected to produce models capable of dealing with complex interactions in social and geographical space, thus enhancing our ability to address more refined research questions. In addition, future research should also look at other decisionmaking settings, including situations related to compressed workweek and potential visibility and/or conformity issues in the workplace, car ownership in the presence of status-seeking behavior, and locational behavior, for example of the elderly, and the role of informal support networks, among others.
In conclusion, there are strong indications that the increased emphasis on activity-based approaches to study travel behavior (McNally, 2000) , and the trend towards behaviorallybased approaches in urban analysis in general (Kanaroglou and Scott, 2003) , will necessitate more realistic representations of the decision-making process. We suggest that, in a natural progression of Salomon's proposition that "human beings are mobile animals" (Salomon, 1985) , the next step towards a more refined understanding of travel behavior will take as a starting point the proposition that human beings are social animals. This step will involve extending existing analytical and conceptual approaches to include elements of interdependent decision-making, interactions between individuals, and information spillovers in a variety of social and geographical settings. Although a number of significant challenges lay ahead -among others, obtaining proper observational data for empirical confirmation of the hypotheses now being advanced by a number of researchers -the present paper represents a step in that direction. Note: CASE 1 = no social influence, CASE 2 = influence from previous adopters only, CASE 3 = influence from previous non-adopters only, CASE 4 = influence from both previous adopters and non-adopters. Numbers are the means of 1000 replications 
